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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper considers the pros and cons of 
establishing stock markets in Sub-Saharan African 
economies at the present stage of their development. 
It provides theoretical analysis and empirical 
evidence from both developing and advanced 
countries to argue that for many African countries 
such a development would be a costly irrelevance 
which they can ill afford; for a number of others, it 
is likely to do more harm than good. The African 
countries would do better to use their scarce human, 
material, and institutional resources to improve their 
banking systems than to promote stock markets.  
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[I am grateful to G. Wingaraja, J. Lallchand, and B. A. Weisse for helpful discussions. The 
usual caveat applies.]. 
 
I. Introduction 
In a recent paper exploring the relationship between a country's financial system, 
industrialisation and economic development, I concluded that stock markets are 
potent symbols of capitalism but paradoxically capitalism flourishes better 
without them (Singh 1997). This paper will be argue that contrary to the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) which are fostering stock market 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this conclusion is particularly 
applicable to economies in that region in their present circumstances. For many 
of these countries such a development would be a costly irrelevance which they 
can ill afford; for a number of others it is likely to do more harm than good. 
 
These are strong conclusions which run contrary to conventional wisdom and 
therefore require careful justification. The paper does so by providing theoretical 
analysis and empirical evidence from developing (DCs) and advanced (ACs) 
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countries.  
   
 
II  Recent Fascination with Stock Markets: Endorsement  
from Unexpected Quarters. 
In the years following the Great Depression of the 1930s, the stock markets were 
held in low esteem, being regarded by many as an important cause of the 
economic slowdown. Keynes (1936) legitimised these concerns by likening the 
stock market to a gambling casino where price formation is often dominated by 
speculators. He thought that if a nation left its investment activities to the 
vagaries of a casino, "the job is likely to be ill-done".  
 
In the present era of celebrating the virtues of markets, such views are regarded 
as heretical. Apart from the efficient allocation of resources and other general 
merits which orthodoxy attributes to stock markets, the IFIs provide some 
specific reasons for encouraging them in DCs 
1
. 
 
First, they suggest that the existing systems of financing long term development 
in DCs, including African ones, are ineffective. Such finance has generally been 
provided by state controlled financial institutions and banks which “directed” 
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subsidised credit towards favoured industries and projects. The results have often 
been bad loans, corruption, inefficient finance and inflation.  
Secondly, the IFIs suggest that stock markets represent a natural progression in 
the economic development of a nation. As a country begins to industrialise, it 
needs more sophisticated markets including stock markets.  
 
It is unsurprising that the IFIs and economic orthodoxy should promote stock 
markets in DCs. However, unexpectedly such an evolution is also being 
recommended by many practitioners who have traditionally not been regarded as 
orthodox.  Thus, Sir Kenneth Berrill’s distinguished Study Group for the 
UNU/WIDER, - a generally heterodox think-tank for DCs -  recommended that 
DCs should encourage stock markets, partly to attract non-debt-creating foreign 
portfolio capital. The latter was thought necessary in the wake of the 1980s debt 
crisis, which would make it difficult for DCS to attract more debt capital. To 
obtain foreign portfolio capital, the Group suggested that restrictions on external 
capital movements should be lifted. However, the Group observed that "the need 
to attract foreign capital in-non-debt-creating forms is only one reason,……. , 
………..to foster ……..emerging equity markets. (These)……….are a vital part 
of economic development - they encourage savings, help channel savings into 
productive investment and encourage entrepreneurs to improve the efficiency of 
                                                                
1
 See, for example, World Bank (1989). 
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investments" (WIDER 1990). 
 
Further afield, Chinese communist government is committed to developing stock 
markets. In 1988 the then Party Secretary General, Zhao Zhiyang, justified this 
position on this subject in Marxist terms, suggesting that at the stage of 
“primitive accumulation” for a DC , it must obey the laws of commodity 
production, i.e. the market, to develop the forces of production.  Zhao asked if 
stock markets can assist capitalist countries, why should socialist countries be 
deprived of such mechanisms? A socialist country was, he thought, better placed 
to deal with the negative effects of stock markets (e.g. speculation) than a 
capitalist country
2
. 
 
Notwithstanding these wide ranging endorsements of stock markets, serious 
doubts abound, paradoxically in the stock market citadels, e.g. the US and the 
UK. The critics argue that stock markets foster an environment of “short-
termism” in which immediate financial gain is preferred to long-term enterprise.  
Many scholars suggest that the stock market domination of the Anglo-Saxon 
economies puts them at a competitive disadvantage with Germany and Japan, 
where the stock market has historically been less important. Porter (1992) has 
observed “The change in nature of competition and the increasing pressure of 
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globalisation make investment the most critical determinant of competitive 
advantage. Yet the US system of allocating investment capital both within and 
across companies is failing. This puts American companies at a serious 
disadvantage in global competition and ultimately threatens the long term growth 
of the US economy”. 
 
In view of these conflicting assessments of the benefits of the stock markets, 
African countries should consider the wisdom of this path. The central analytical 
and policy issue is - will the promotion of stock markets help or hinder the real 
economy at the current stage of African development? Before answering this, it is 
useful to review the recent stock market experience of African countries from an 
international perspective. 
 
 
 III Stock Markets Expansion in Africa and Other Industrialising 
 Economies 
Many African countries began to reform their financial sectors as a part of the 
IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s
3
 and 
                                                                
2.
 For a fuller discussion of the stock market in socialist economies such as China, see Singh 
(1990). 
3.For a fuller discussion of the financial sector reforms under structural adjustment in 
African countries, see World Bank (1994). 
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 as a part of this process, some countries established stock exchanges or 
expanded existing ones. Ducker (1996) observes “stock exchanges had become 
the 1990s equivalent of National Anthems and Flags in Africa”. He notes several 
African countries are establishing stock exchanges despite their weak private 
sectors.  
 
Tables 1-4 provide information on the stock market development in a) African 
countries in the 1990s; b) for comparative purposes on some leading emerging 
markets from other regions; c) to obtain a global perspective two advanced 
country markets, Italy and the UK. Data is provided on the following variables: 
market capitalisation in absolute terms, as well as relative to GDP (Tables 1 and 
2); trading value and the turnover ratio, i.e. trading value expressed as a 
proportion of market capitalisation (Table 3); numbers of listed companies and 
their average price-earning ratios (Table 4). 
 
As Table 1 shows, the aggregate African picture is overwhelmingly dominated 
by the South African stock market. In 1995, in terms of market capitalisation, the 
South African market was the tenth largest in the world, bigger than any of the 
leading emerging markets in Tables 1-4. The market capitalisation of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange exceeded by a wide margin that of Italy. 
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The South African market accounted for more than 14% of the total market 
capitalisation of emerging markets in 1995 (see Table 1). However, market 
capitalisation of the rest of the existing stock markets in Africa together 
amounted to less than 1% of the emerging markets’ capitalisation. Some of the 
new African stock markets are very small, e.g.. Swaziland’s stock market had 
only four listed companies in 1995 - a 100% growth since 1991 when there were 
only two. Nevertheless, it is important to record that there were just four stock 
exchanges in Africa in 1990 compared with fourteen today
4
. Even leaving aside 
South Africa, the other African markets have registered a tenfold increase in 
market capitalisation between 1990 - 1995. 
 
Other than South Africa, the most significant markets in Africa are those of 
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Egypt and perhaps Mauritius. Compared with leading 
markets in other developing regions, these African markets are quite small in 
terms of any of the relevant variables: market capitalisation, the value of the 
shares traded or the number of quoted companies. 
 
                     
4.In addition to the twelve African stock markets listed in tables 1-4, there are two 
others - Zambia and Malawi. The Lusaka stock exchange was opened two years ago 
and has two listed companies. Tanzania is expected to initiate a stock market shortly. 
For a fuller discussion of recent developments  in African stock markets, see further 
Ducker (1996) and Hartland-Peel (1996). 
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The average price-earnings ratios of companies listed on African stock markets 
range from 7 or 8 in Swaziland, Ghana and Zimbabwe to 12.5 in Nigeria, to 18.8 
in South Africa and to 26 in Tunisia. Generally, the leading markets in other 
regions have much higher ratios. However, as in the case of emerging markets 
elsewhere, the African markets display considerable volatility in share prices and 
returns to investors. For example, the Zimbabwe market recorded a huge average 
total annual return (in US$) of 143.8% in 1993. However, in the previous two 
years there were negative returns of 52.3% and 59.8% respectively. Similarly, in 
the Nigerian market, the average investor would have suffered a loss of 35.9% in 
1992, of 11.6% in 1993, but would have made a large total gain of 190.9% in 
1994
5
. These enormous fluctuations in investor returns reflect volatility in both 
share prices and exchange rates. 
 
 IV Stock markets and Long Run Economic Development: 
 Theoretical Considerations 
In textbook economic theory, the stock markets can promote economic growth 
through: 
a)    increasing savings and investments. 
b)    improving the productivity of investments 
c)   raising the profitability of existing capital stock. 
                     
5.The figures reported in this paragraph come from IFC (1996). 
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Stock markets may raise an economy’s savings and investment rates through two 
different mechanisms.  Firstly, the markets provide new savings instruments 
which may better meet liquidity requirements or the time preferences of some 
households or firms, which ceteris paribus, may lead to more savings than before. 
 Secondly, a stock market helps to collect together small savings of thousands of 
individuals and converts them into funds for large investment projects.  Thus, the 
market provides a mechanism for risk sharing which enables economic agents to 
finance and own a small share of e.g. a steel plant or a shipyard.  Without such 
risk sharing and associated functions of screening and monitoring investment 
projects which stock markets perform, many such projects may not be undertaken 
at all. 
 
The stock markets can help improve the productivity of investments partly 
through more efficient allocation of investment resources and partly through 
promoting technical change. A perfect stock market pricing system will allocate 
investment funds to their most profitable uses, according lower share prices to 
the less than the more efficient corporations;  the latter being rewarded by the 
relative lowering of their cost of capital 
6
.  
                     
6.The reader will notice that in accordance with the normal calculus of a capitalist 
economy, the words “profitability” and “efficiency” are used interchangeably in this 
exposition. The two will, of course, diverge if there are externalities. 
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Apart from ensuring an efficient allocation of a society’s investment resources, 
the stock markets can also ensure that the existing capital stock of an economy is 
most profitably utilised. This is brought about by a take-over mechanism which 
leads to corporations which are not utilising their assets well, being acquired by 
those who can exploit these resources more effectively
7
. 
 
Recent theoretical work in this area, based on endogenous growth models, 
emphasises the capacity of the stock markets to promote innovation and technical 
progress. This is done practically by devices such as venture capital funds.  In 
more technical terms, the stock market provides a mechanism whereby market 
participants utilise their collective knowledge to assess competing new 
technological inventions. The market  is therefore better able to finance the most 
promising technologies compared with, say,  the banks which do not have the 
collective wisdom of numerous participants
8
. 
 
This is the textbook story; its validity, however, depends crucially on : 
 (a)     the nature and properties of the pricing mechanism which prevails on the 
  stock market  
(b)  the nature and characteristics of the take-over mechanism.  
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There are widely divergent analyses on both issues. The textbook position on 
stock market prices is that they are probably “efficient”. This is because for a 
typical company share on the market, there are many well-informed dealers in a 
homogenous product.  It is, therefore, a perfect market which can be expected to 
generate efficient prices. 
 
However, an alternative Keynesian view is that since we live in an uncertain 
world where it is difficult to ascertain what the long-term prospects of investment 
projects are, price formation on the stock market is inevitably subject to 
speculation and may actually be dominated by it.  In a famous passage, Keynes 
(1936 p.156) described the pricing of shares on the stock market thus: 
 ”professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in 
 which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
 photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most 
 nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; 
 so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds 
 prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other 
 competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of 
                                                                
7.See further Marris (1964); Singh (1971, 1975). 
8.See further King and Levine (1993) 
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 view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgement, 
 are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks 
 the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
 intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion 
 to be. And there are some, I believe who practise the fourth, fifth and higher 
 degrees”. 
 
Which of these two views of the stock market pricing process is more accurate is 
considered in the next section. We note that just as there are alternative theories 
about the stock market pricing process, there are also divergent views about the 
efficacy of the take-over mechanism.  Recent theoretical work shows that there 
are a number of reasons (transactions costs; inadequate information; free rider 
problems), why the take-over mechanism may not work according to the 
textbook story. It may not only be ineffective in disciplining poorly performing 
corporations but may also in fact produce perverse results. Stein (1988, 1989) has 
shown that even if there are rational markets, because of take-overs, it may pay 
managers to be myopic, i.e. attempt to make a quick profit to avert the danger of 
a fall in share prices and hence of being acquired.   
 
Another important controversial issue is concerns the question of stock market 
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liquidity which textbook analysis regards as a virtue since liquid stock markets as 
in the US and the UK enable economic agents to trade on the secondary marketat 
will. This reduces risk and should induce greater savings and investments. Instant 
liquidity is however a double-edged sword in that the investors have no 
commitment to the corporation whose shares they own.  This can lead to serious 
problems of corporate governance with important implications for the real 
economy
9
. 
 
V  Empirical Evidence: Advanced Countries 
It is useful to consider empirical evidence on the analytical issues outlined above 
separately forACs and DCs. The former have well-organised stock markets 
where reliable information about corporations is systematically gathered and  
rapidly transmitted to all which is not the case in most emerging markets.
10
  
 
On the efficiency of actual share prices, Tobin (1984) distinguished between 
“fundamental valuation efficiency” and “information arbitrage efficiency”. The 
former refers to whether relative share prices reflect the fundamentals, i.e. the 
                     
9.Bhide (1994); Stiglitz (1985). 
10.A few years ago the Economist noted with respect to Taiwan’s stock market, the 
largest in the third world: “(It) is a rigged casino with a phenomenal turnover...its 
family controlled firms equate accountancy with tax-evading creativity. Its courts 
react...to the nudges of the influential...it is as free-wheeling and corrupt as the 
Philippines, but...is a free-wheel that works” quoted in Singh (1997). See also Singh 
(1998a). 
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relative expected profitability of corporations. Information arbitrage efficiency 
on the other hand refers to how quickly information is disseminated within the 
market. Empirical evidence suggests that although share prices may be efficient 
in the latter sense, they do not necessarily conform to fundamental values, being  
often dominated by “noise traders” and affected by whims, fads and contagion. 
The market also evidently gives much greater weight in price formation to near- 
than to long-term performance
11
.  
 
Since insurance companies and pension funds with long-term liabilities play a 
major role on the stock markets, that should arguably discourage short-termism. 
Unfortunately, evidence shows that it does not. The main reason is that the fund 
management industry is highly competitive and the fund managers’ own 
performance is judged over relatively short time intervals. One result of this 
situation is the much greater “churning” of portfolios by pension fund managers 
than by individuals, i.e. the former typically hold the stock for considerably 
shorter period than ordinary investors [for a fuller discussion of this issue, see Cosh, 
Hughes and Singh (1990)].  
 
The evidence on whether the stock market promotes savings is not very 
                     
11.For a review of the empirical evidence on share prices and for different views on 
the subject see the 1990 special issue of Journal of Economic Perspectives; see also 
Camerer (1989); Miles (1993). 
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promising
12
 18. The savings rates of the world’s leading stock market economy, 
namely the US, is considerably lower than in Japan and Germany. At the 
disaggregated corporate level, research by Mayer (1989) and Corbett and 
Jenkinson (1994) shows that the net contribution of equity markets to the 
financing of corporate investment in the non-financial sector in countries like the 
US and UK is often negative. In other words, more shares are redeemed (through 
take-overs, etc.) than are issued to fund new investment projects. In accordance 
with the “pecking order hypothesis” US and UK corporations appear to rely 
overwhelmingly on internal finance to fund their investment needs
13
.19 
 
There is a large body of evidence for industrial countries suggesting that the take-
over mechanism does not work according to the text book prescriptions. The 
competitive selection process via the market for corporate control does not 
simply punish the inefficient or the unprofitable and reward the efficient. 
Empirical studies show that selection in the market for corporate control takes 
place only partially on the basis of profitability or the firm’s stock market 
valuation, but much more so on the basis of size. It is almost always the large 
firms that take over the small. A relatively unprofitable big firm has a much 
                     
12.Theoretically, whether stock markets actually promote savings or not will depend 
on the utility function of the individual. To the extent that stock markets reduce the 
transaction costs as well as other risks involved in savings, it may lead to a fall rather 
than a rise in the savings rate. Pagano (1993b). 
13.However, see further Singh (1994, 1995a). 
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better chance of survival than a more profitable small firm
14 
. 
 
Further, the evidence on post-merger profitability of amalgamating firms also 
also does not assist stock market proponents. It invariably shows that the 
profitability of merging firms declines rather than improves following take-
overs
15 
. Moreover, the stock market critics pinpoint Japan and Germany which 
do not have an active market for corporate control and yet their corporations have 
been highly successful in the international market place; their competitive 
success is precisely because of the absence of hostile take-overs, thus enabling 
managers to ignore short-term profits, take a long view and aggressively bid for 
market share. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon managers are obliged to give primary 
attention to their earnings per share figures every quarter so as not to disappoint 
the market and thereby suffer a fall in the share price making them vulnerable to 
take-overs.  
 
VI Empirical Evidence: Developing Countries 
As noted earlier, compared with the highly organised and properly regulated 
stock market activity in the US and the UK, most DCs do not have such well-
                     
14.For recent reviews of the evidence on take-overs, see Singh (1992, 1993a); Mueller 
(1992); Hughes (1994). 
15.There is however an “event studies” approach to this subject which apparently 
arrives at rather different conclusions – it shows that the stock market valuation of 
merging firms increases around the time of the merger event. Singh (1992) and 
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functioning markets. Not only is there inadequate government regulation,  private 
information gathering and disseminating firms as found in more developed stock 
markets do not exist. Moreover, young firms in emerging stock markets do not 
have a long enough track record to form a “reputation.” Consequently, one 
expects share prices in DC markets to be “noisy”, often arbitrary and volatile 
(Tirole, 1991). 
 
Share price volatility is a negative feature of stock markets for several reasons. 
First, it reduces the efficiency of the price signals in allocating investment 
resources. Secondly, it increases the riskiness of investments and may discourage 
risk-averse corporations from financing their growth by equity issuesand indeed 
from seeking a stock market listing. Thirdly, at the macroeconomic level, a 
highly volatile stock market may lead to financial fragility for the whole 
economy.  
 
Empirical evidence indicates that share prices in DC markets are considerably 
more volatile than in AC markets. (See for example, El-Erian and Kumar, 1995; 
Singh, 1994). However, despite this volatility, DC firms do not shun the market. 
The Indian stock market, for example, has 8000 firms listed on it, the highest in 
the world (exceeding by a small margin the US total).  
                                                                
Charkham (1995) provide a reconciliation of the two sets of results. 
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In the first large scale empirical studies of corporate finance in developing 
countries, Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) showed that contrary to a 
priori expectations, DC corporations rely heavily on (a) external finance, and (b) 
within external finance to a surprisingly large degree on equity finance to meet 
their needs for long-term investment funds. Singh, (1995), outlined a theory to 
explain these anomalous findings.  
 
Nevertheless what these results indicate is that DC stock markets have been 
useful in providing considerable funds to the large corporations (normally the 
100 largest) in the Singh and Hamid, and Singh studies in the 1980s. However, 
although the corporate sector clearly gained from stock market activity, this 
research also indicated that the economy as a whole gained little. All that 
happened in many countries was a portfolio substitution from bank savings to 
investment in corporate shares without any increase in the economy’s aggregate 
savings or investments.
16 
 
 
One strand of empirical research on stock markets and economic growth, 
involving DCs,  has been international cross section studies, based on Barro-type 
regression analysis which show that stock markets positively affect long term 
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economic growth. Research by Atje and Javanovic (1993) suggested that 
establishment of stock markets is likely to raise a typical DC’s growth rate by a 
huge 2.5 per cent p.a., but that banks have little influence on economic growth. 
Conversely, a methodologically similar study by Levine and Zervos (1995) 
suggests that banks and stock markets are complementary in making a positive 
contribution to economic growth. 
 
However, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) suggest these cross-section studies 
have severe limitations, being usually based on reduced form equations, makes it 
difficult to infer causality from them. More importantly, this research abstracts 
from the essential channels of transmission by which the stock market can in 
principle affect economic growth. It ignores altogether the deficiencies of the 
pricing mechanism and the take over process on the real world stock markets 
outlined earlier. 
 
VII  Portfolio Capital Flows 
There has been a sea-change in the nature of external capital flows to DCs during 
the last ten years. Not have these flows increased greatly, they are now also 
dominated by private capital rather than official flows (see Table 5). Net direct 
                                                                
16.For a detailed analysis of these issues, see further Singh (1997); Singh and Weisse 
(1998); Nagaraj (1997).  
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investment and portfolio flows have replaced borrowing and debt as the principle 
vehicles for the inflows into DCs. Between 1983-88 and 1989-95 net portfolio 
investment in these countries rose almost tenfold, and during the second period it 
was the largest source of external capital. 
 
The reasons for this huge increase  in portfolio capital flows lie on both the 
demand and supply sides. The main force with respect to demand has been the 
liberal economic reforms which many countries have undertaken in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Financial liberalisation and stock market growth have been important 
in attracting portfolio flows. On the supply side, the enormous increase in the 
resources of the pension funds and those of other institutional investors in 
advanced countries have obliged the fund managers to seek to diversify their 
portfolios to continue to maintain or improve their risk-adjusted rates of return
17 
b
. 
 
As noted earlier, in the WIDER Study Group report following the 1980s debt 
crisis, portfolio capital was thought to have many attractions for developing 
countries. UNIDO (1996) report specifically notes the following benefits: 
                     
17.For a fuller discussion of these issues see Singh and Weisse (1998); IMF (1996, 
1997); Reisen (1996); Fernandez and Arias-Montiel (1996). 
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 strengthening a country’s external payments position; 
 contributing to domestic capital market development and providing funding 
for industrial development; 
 lowering the cost of capital; 
 assisting the privatisation process indirectly, by fostering capital market 
development, or directly, by financing buy-outs of state enterprises; 
 encouraging FDI; 
 raising a country’s economic profile and that of its leading stock exchange-
listed corporations. 
In the event, (see Table 5),  most portfolio capital flows went to Latin American 
and Asian countries with Africa receiving on average negative inflows for the 
period 1989-1995. However as disaggregated figures for the individual years 
indicate, the net inflows for African countries in the last four years have become 
positive. 
 
Table 6 provides information on private capital flows to individual African 
countries during the 1990s.  Since only a small number of African countries have 
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stock markets, the table shows, unsurprisingly, that most African countries did 
not attract any portfolio capital flows. Further, South Africa received most of the 
region’s portfolio flows. SSA’s record as regards the FDI inflows is relatively 
much better, both in terms of the aggregate amount of investment, as well as its 
distribution among countries.  Nevertheless, it has been estimated that between 
1990 and 1997 the SSA countries received a cumulative FDI flow of $23 billion, 
less than 5 per cent of this total for all DCs.  Moreover seventy percent of the 
region’s FDI went to oil producers  (Angola and Nigeria) and to Ghana, Uganda 
and South Africa. (See Financial Times, June 1998). 
 
In the wake of declining official aid flows to SSA countries during the last 
decade they clearly need to seek more capital from private sources. SSA 
economies received official development assistance of $13 billion in 1997 - $3 
billion less than in 1990.  The important question is, should the African countries 
make a determined effort to attract more portfolio capital to compensate for the 
official aid shortfall?  Should they, for example, establish stock markets and 
institute capital account liberalisation to induce fund managers in advanced 
countries to invest in SSA securities?.   
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The experience of many Asian and Latin American countries with portfolio 
capital flows during the last decade indicate that the African countries would 
benefit from using their efforts and institutional resources to attract FDI rather 
than portfolio flows.  The difficulties of portfolio capital flows for DCs may be 
illustrated by the case of Mexico - one of the  largest recipients of such flows 
since the late 1980s.  Following the euphoria connected with Mexico’s accession 
to the North American Free Trade Area, it received net capital inflows of $91 
billion during 1990-1993 - one fifth of all net inflows to DCs. The annual capital 
inflow between 1992 and 1994 amounted to 8% of GDP compared with a figure 
of 5% during the previous peak of 1977 - 1981 which is generally thought to 
have spawned the 1980s international debt crisis. 
 
Most of the inflows consisted of portfolio capital - 67% of the total net inflows 
between 1990 - 1993. These inflows helped generate a stock market boom; the 
share price index rose from 250 in 1989 to around 2500 in 1994. Following 
Rodrik (1994) and Krugman (1995), Singh (1997) notes that these portfolio 
flows were not responding to fundamentals but represented a misplaced euphoria 
and “herd” instinct. The Mexican economy expanded at a rate of only 3.5% p.a. 
between 1990 - 1994 despite a widening current account deficit. In 1993 the 
current account deficit was 6% of GDP although the economy grew by only 0.6% 
 25 
in that year. The deficit rose to 9% GDP in 1994 as economic growth increased 
to 3.5% p.a. Between 1990 and 1994 Mexican private savings collapsed from 
15% to 5% of GDP. Thus, foreign capital inflows largely replaced domestic 
savings and generated a consumption boom. The market was therefore not 
rewarding virtue and frugality but essentially a consumption binge. 
 
The consequences for the Mexican economy were catastrophic when the 
speculative bubble burst in December 1994. The country’s GDP fell by nearly 
7% in 1995; other Latin American economies, notably Argentina, suffered 
heavily through the contagion effect. Indeed the IMF justified its 
unprecedentedly large rescue package for Mexico of $50 billion on the grounds 
that it threatened the viability of the entire international financial system. 
 
From the perspective of a DC, much of portfolio capital inflows is literally “hot 
money”, which enormously increase the vulnerability of the economy not just to 
international economic shocks but also to domestic shocks, greatly magnifying 
their effects. The main reason being that such flows lead to an interaction 
between two inherently unstable markets - the stock market and the currency 
market. In the event of a large shock (domestic or external) these interactions 
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generate a negative feedback, which may lead to, or greatly worsen,  a financial 
crisis. This has not only been the experience of both Mexico during the financial 
crisis of 1994-1995 and of South East Asian countries in the current crisis. It is 
too near the events to form a definite judgement about the essential causes of the 
present South East Asian crisis - whether for example these are domestic or 
external.  Nevertheless, whatever the cause of the crisis, it is clear that the 
interactions between the stock market and the currency market have greatly 
exacerbated the crisis. What developing countries need for speedy 
industrialisation and quicker economic growth is patient long-term external (as 
well as domestic) capital, rather than the “fly by night” speculative variety.  
It has been suggested that the 1994 Mexican crisis was due to volatility of short 
term capital flows rather than being caused by the stock market per se.  It can 
thus be argued that regulating short term capital flows is the appropriate solution 
instead of limiting the development of the stock market.  However, the important 
point is that even though the tesobonos may have been the immediate trigger for 
the crisis, the withdrawal of portfolio capital flows greatly contributed to the 
spread and propagation of the crisis.  It is not clear that taxation of short term 
portfolio flows of the Chilean kind would have been enough to stem the outflow 
once a crisis had occurred.  The essential point of the argument made above is 
that if stock markets, together with capital account liberalisation, are used to 
 27 
attract foreign portfolio capital it makes the economy much more fragile because 
of the interactions  that it leads to between two inherently unstable asset markets. 
 Since African countries are more likely to be prone to internal (e.g. political) and 
external (e.g. terms of trade) shocks, such market interactions are likely to lead to 
much greater economic and financial instability.  These countries are therefore 
better advised to encourage foreign direct investment rather than to establish 
stock markets  in order to attract portfolio capital flows
17
 . 
 
VIII Stock Market v/s Bank-Based Capitalism: A Historical 
Perspective 
 
As suggested earlier it is arguable whether stock markets even in advanced 
countries help the real economy on balance. These markets often lead to short-
termism which may adversely affect a country’s international competitiveness 
and hence long term economic growth. The effects of short-termism are 
compounded by the distortions to the incentive system which the stock markets 
generate. In the stock market dominated economies, often the highest rewards go 
                     
17b. It is argued that encouraging stock markets may also encourage FDI through the sale of 
state-owned enterprises on the stock market. However, the existence of a stock market is 
neither a necessity nor a sufficient condition for such sales. The government can auction such 
enterprises more directly to suitably qualified domestic or foreign buyers rather than to leave 
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to those who are skilled in financial engineering rather than those who create real 
wealth by product improvement or technological innovations.
 18
 
 
The records of stock market dominated economies, e.g. the US and UK compared 
with those where stock markets do not play a significant role (Germany, Japan, 
Italy and other continental European countries) indicate that over the long run, 
the latter have outperformed the former in terms of savings, investment, 
international market share and economic growth. For example, with respect to 
industrialisation of Italy during this century, Pagano (1993b) noted that there was 
a long run secular decline in the stock market growth relative to that of the 
economy as a whole. The ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP in Italy in 
1906 was 23 percent compared with 12.6 percent in 1991.  The numbers of listed 
companies do not appear to have changed much either.  Pagano observed that the 
                                                                
it to the vagaries of the stock market.  
18.The underlying theoretical reasons why the stock market does not conform to the 
text book analysis have been explored in a number of contributions in recent years. 
This literature by and large provides a formalisation of Keynes’ “beauty contest 
model” of stock market pricing (discussed earlier) as well as of his other important 
observations in chapter 12 of The General Theory. See in particular Stiglitz (1983), 
Allen and Gale (1995), Banerjee (1993), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), 
Dimaggio and Powell (1983), Journal of Economic Perspectives (1990) (special 
issue). The main anlytical conclusion which emerges from this literature is that unlike 
other markets, financial markets are particularly prone to co-ordination failures as they 
are acutely subject to the problems of asymmetric information, moral hazard and 
adverse selection. These co-ordination failures can be improved by government 
intervention and indeed the economic cost of non-intervention may be huge. In 
practice the costs of such market failures have to be weighed against the costs of 
“government failure” before it can be concluded how much and where the government 
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tremendous growth in manufacturing and GDP during Italy’s ‘economic miracle’ 
of the 1950s and early 1960s occurred without any increase in listed companies 
or total stock market capitalisation . 
 
Similarly, the post-war miracle of former West Germany occurred without any 
help from the stock markets. With respect to Japan, there is evidence that after 
the war, the Japanese government deliberately discouraged the growth of stock 
markets in favour of banks in the organisation of its financial system.  The 
extraordinary transformation of the Japanese economy in the 1950s and 1960s 
also occurred without any assistance from the stock market. Indeed, Dore (1985) 
notes that in Japan the stock market is viewed socially with some suspicion as a 
gambling den. Unlike the UK and the US, the best and the brightest young 
graduates of Japanese universities do not seek careers on the stock market but in 
the government or corporations. In Germany, the lack of significance of the stock 
market is indicated in part by its very low capitalisation ratio. The number of 
companies quoted on the Frankfurt stock market during much of the post-war 
period has been about 400 of which only 25 or so are actively traded.  
 
 Equally importantly, the much bigger miracle of late industrialising countries 
like Taiwan and Korea over the last three decades has also been accomplished 
                                                                
should intervene. See further Stiglitz (1994). 
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independently of the stock markets.  In all these countries the banks (in the case 
of Taiwan and S. Korea, state owned ones) have played the central role in 
promoting long-term industrialisation. 
 
There are two general points which emerge from the above account which are 
particularly relevant forDCs. Firstly, the superior long-term economic record of 
bank-based economies relative to stock market dominated economies is not an 
accident.  Modern economic theory offers analytical reasons for this 
phenomenon.  The bank-based financial systems are better able to deal with 
problems of asymmetric information, transaction costs and disciplining 
inefficient managers than stock market based systems
19
20  Secondly, the IFIs claim 
referred to in the introduction that stock market development is simply a higher 
stage in the evolution of a market economy, is not valid.  The economic history 
of continental Europe as well as Japan demonstrates that bank-based systems are 
more than adequate to permit a very high level of economic development.  There 
is no necessary natural progression from the bank-based economy to a stock 
market economy
20
21. 
 
If the above analysis is correct and the bank-based systems are superior to the 
                     
19.There is a large literature on the subject. For a recent review, see Aoki & Patrick 
(1996). 
20.For a fuller discussion of this issue, see de Cecco (1993) 
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stock market economies, why have countries like Japan and Korea been 
expanding their stock markets in the last two decades? The reason for this is not 
that their existing bank-based systems have turned out to be inadequate but rather 
that under US pressure these countries have been obliged to open up their 
financial sectors.  They have however done so reluctantly and as little as they 
could get away with.  Nevertheless, even the limited financial liberalisation 
which these countries have implemented has caused serious difficulties for the 
bank-based systems and indeed many would argue that it is responsible for the 
present financial crisis in these countries
21
22 
 
IX Summing Up and A Perspective on African Banking  
This paper has reviewed analyses and evidence on the role of stock markets in 
promoting long-term economic growth. It has been suggested here that 
notwithstanding the textbook virtues of stock markets, they have important 
drawbacks for developing countries including those in Africa:  
 
First, for such economies, because of the greater volatility of their stock markets, 
the difficulties of short-termism and distorted incentives which advanced stock 
                     
21.It has become common place among Western commentators to blame the so-called 
Asian model for the present financial crisis in East and South East Asia. Singh 
(forthcoming) provides detailed a analysis of the issue and concludes that precipitate 
financial liberalisation has been the main reason for the economic and financial crisis, 
rather than the specific model of capitalism that these countries followed.  
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market economies experience, will be greatly exaggerated. 
 
Secondly, the establishment or the encouragement of stock markets together with 
capital account liberalisation in order to attract foreign portfolio capital raises 
further problems for the emerging markets, even the most developed among 
them.  
 
Thirdly, and equally importantly, most African countries have to contend with 
another crucial issue, namely, the lack of an adequate banking system with 
prudential regulation.  This is what is urgently required at this stage of their 
economic development, rather than stock markets which are likely to divert 
resources away from this essential task.  
 
If the banking system is weak and unreliable, a stock market is simply likely to 
add to the fragility of the financial system.  Only in abstract economic theory can 
some of the inherent weaknesses of banks (e.g. “adverse selection” of borrowers 
due to asymmetric information -- see further Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983), be 
ameliorated by the establishment of the stock market (Cho, 1988; 1989); (see 
however, Singh, 1993).  However, that abstraction requires both banks and stock 
markets to be fully developed.   
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This is far from reality in most African countries.  The serious shortcomings of 
the African banks have recently been reviewed by World Bank (1994).  Most 
African banks are state or foreign owned.  The latter tend to be very conservative 
and generally serve only the needs of large firms and multinational enterprises.  
The state-owned banks, on the other hand, are inefficiently managed and lend a 
large part of their resources to government parastatals  and neglect the credit 
needs of domestic small enterprises.  In response to these gaps in domestic 
financial intermediation during the last decade or so, a number of local private 
sector banks have emerged in countries like Kenya, Uganda and Zambia.  Since 
the mid-1980s they have gained a significant share of banking and financial 
markets in these three countries and in Nigeria where the local banks have a 
longer history.  However, despite their many clear advantages (e.g. providing 
competition to state-owned banks, filling the gaps in financial intermediation) the 
local banks have not been successful.  A substantial number of them have failed 
due largely to non-performing loans. Brownbridge (1998) notes that “arrears 
affecting more than half the loan portfolio were typical for failed banks”. 
 
Data on assets and deposits and available estimated loan losses of the failed 
banks in the four countries are given in Table 7. Failed banks accounted for a 
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significant proportion of total bank assets, particularly in Zambia and Kenya. It is 
difficult to estimate the cost of these bank failures to the depositors and/or the 
governments because very little public information is available on the subject. 
Nevertheless, Brownbridge (1998) notes that a Kenyan parliamentary statement 
in October 1995 reported that the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) lost a sum 
equivalent to nearly 4% of the 1993 GDP from frauds connected with the 
“political banks”. The CBK gave liquidity support to three of the failed banks in 
1992-93 which amounted to 6.6 % of GDP. Brownbridge (1998) further notes 
that “the provision of (this) liquidity support ….. was the major cause of the loss 
of monetary control and the subsequent inflation in the country”.  
 
Turning to the state-owned banks in Africa, the World Bank (1994, pp 116-117) 
observed:  “Restructuring and recapitalising insolvent or undercapitalised banks 
has been another important part of adjustment programs…Bank recapitalisations 
in Africa - without corresponding changes in the real sector, such as restructuring 
the parastatals - have generally failed.  In the Central African Republic, one bank 
has been restructured three times.  In Mauritania, five major state-owned banks 
were recapitalised at a cost of nearly 15 percent of GDP in 1988, but they are 
again suffering  large losses of up to 50 or 60 percent of total loans.  In Kenya in 
1989, eight failed institutions were merged into a “turnaround” bank, 
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Consolidated Bank Limited, now in difficulty.  The recapitalisation operations 
have also been expensive.  The fiscal cost in some cases was between 1 and 2 
percent of GDP - 1.5 percent of GDP in Ghana, 2 percent in Guinea, and 1.5 
percent in Madagascar; in other cases it was much larger.  In Senegal the cost 
came to about 15 percent of GDP…In Tanzania the cost of a partial restructuring 
is estimated at roughly 40 percent of GDP.” 
 
The African countries, therefore, have quite a way to go before they can be 
regarded as being established, well-functioning and competitive banking systems 
let alone a banking system of the Japanese/German type with superior 
developmental potential.  World Bank (1994) rightly notes for African countries 
the general scarcity of skilled and qualified managers and regulators in this area. 
Moreover, many countries still need to devise a regulatory and legal framework 
for the adequate operation of a modern banking system. 
 
 
X. Conclusion. 
When the banking systems are seriously inadequate, as is evidently the case in a 
large majority of SSA economies, it suggests a perverse order of priorities to use 
scarce human and institutional resources for the establishment of stock markets 
 36 
rather than for the improvement of the banking systems. Moreover, for the typical 
African economy, even if no harm is done to the real economy, a stock market 
will be at best a costly irrelevance, in the sense that it would only benefit a small 
number of urban corporations, if anyone at all. It would not help meet the savings 
and investment needs of the great majority of the work force who are engaged in 
agriculture or informal activities.  These are more likely to be met by an 
appropriate extension of the banking system.  Further, it has been argued here 
that DCs , particularly in Africa, would be better advised to encourage foreign 
direct investment of the appropriate kind rather than foreign portfolio capital.  
The latter, it is suggested, is not conducive to long term economic growth as it 
engenders economic and financial fragility. 
 
In the light of the considerations outlined in this paper, the allocation of thescarce 
human, material and institutional resources to the creation of stock market 
capitalism in the African context would therefore seem to be particularly 
unjustified.  
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